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I. Introduction
  In another article in this Law Review,l» I reviewed current patchwork legal 
protections against genetic discrimination in the U.S.A. and identified their 
limitations, including the first Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act passed in 
the U.S. Senate. However, the key issues over genetic anti-discrimination laws 
were not examined. The mission of this paper is to address these issues and also 
point out the practical and theoretical flaws of the non-discrimination legislation 
which separate genetic information from non-genetic medical information. 
  As I reviewed in another paper mentioned above, manyattempts to pass the 
federal bill failed in the U.S. Congress. Some of the reasons for these failures lie in 
the fact that there were strong political lobby by the health insurance industry and 
the fact that genetic discrimination was not yet perceived by the majority of the 
people. However, I believe that one of the main reasons cornes from the following 
problems inherited in the legislation. Even though any genetic-specific anti-
discrimination law may have good intentions to prohibit genetic discrimination and 
protect the genetic privacy of the people, such legislations have serions practical 
and normative flaws that cannot be easily eliminated by measures. Before 
addressing these issues, I will look into the key issues of genetic anti-discrimination 
laws: the scope of genetic information and its definitional problems (Section II-A). 
I will demonstrate the problems both in the narrow definition and the broad 
definition by giving several examples. I will also'examine the affirmative use of 
"favorable" genetic information (Section II -B). This issue occurs as genetic tests 
become cheaper and more common, and people want to use their favorable genetic 
test results, sometimes called "clean genetic bills", to get insurance at a cheaper 
price and to take any advantage in career promotion and the like. Another issue 
that I will examine is "authorized" disclosure and différent types of regulatory 
strategy, and I will explain the importance of prohibiting access to and acquisition 
of genetic information (Section II-C). 
  Then, in Section III, I will discuss the issues of practical and normative 
problems inherited in genetic-specific legislation. These problems are derived from 
the so called "genetic exceptionalism" which means genetic information is uniquely 
sensitive and fundamentally différent from other medical information, and therefore 
it requires and deserves special legal protection. Virtually no genetic-specific
1) Legal Protection Restricting Genetic Discrimination in U.S.A.
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legislation can be drafted without depending on some version of genetic 
exceptionalism because defining genetic information is unavoidable and such a 
practice more or less presupposes that a line can be drawn between genetic and 
non-genetic information. It will be shown why it is practically impossible to draw a 
line between genetic information and other medical information (Section III-A). I 
argue that this practical impossibility to distinguish between the two causes 
definitional problems in the genetic-specific anti-discrimination laws, and I address 
how these definitional difficulties of genetic information resulted in both under-
inclusiveness (Section III-C) and over-inclusiveness (Section III-B) of the 
protection against genetic discrimination. However, a more important and 
fundamental problem inherent in the laws is the normative problem incurred by 
genetic exceptionalism. 
  In Section IV, I will demonstrate how genetic-specific anti-discrimination laws 
produce unequal and unintended consequences that occur between the people with 
genetically linked health problems and those with non-genetic health problems. I 
argue that it is not fair for the law to protect only genetic privacy and prohibit only 
genetic discrimination while leaving the people with non-genetic diseases 
unprotected. Moreover, this inequality leads to inequality between the classes. 
These normative problems raise the fairness issue that we all have to answer before 
we enact genetic anti-discrimination laws. One of the few arguments addressing 
these issues seriously is presented by Sonia M. Suter. By introducing her insightful 
arguments in detail, I will point out the fundamental problems of genetic-specific 
anti-discrimination laws. Here, we face a dilemma: on the one hand, there is a 
strong need to prevent genetic discrimination, but on the other hand, genetic-
specific anti-discrimination laws have unavoidable practical problems and 
fundamental normative problems which result in unintended unfair consequences. 
In Section IV-D, I will consider alternative ways to protect all predictive medical 
information from discriminatory use in the insurance arena. A national single-
payer / mandatory community-rating health insurance system will be addressed. 
  I conclude that the real issue that we face right here is not how to prevent 
"genetic" discrimination but the very issue that we have to debate seriously is 
whether or not the law should ban discrimination on the basis of all predictive 
medical information.
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II. Key Issues of Genetic Anti-Discrimination Laws
  In the subsequent sections I wili address the key issues in drafting genetic-
specific anti-discrimination laws and then identify the nature of genetic information 
as preliminary inquiries for the examination of practical and normative problems 
incurred by genetic exceptionalism.
A. Scope of Genetic 
  Definition
Information: The Problem in Narrow and Broad
  One of the most difficult issues that all lawmakers face in drafting genetic anti-
discrimination legislation is the scope and definition of "genetic information." 
Many commentators have already pointed out the serious problems both in the 
narrow definition and the broad definition. In this section, I will present some such 
examinations regarding definitional questions addressed by commentators, and 
demonstrate the difficulties in defining "genetic information."
                a. Problems in Narrow Definition 
  Henry T. Greely gives an example of narrow definition by referring to the 
Wisconsin Statutes; "a test using deoxyribonucleic acid extracted from an 
individual's cells in order to determine the presence of genetic disease or disorder 
or the individual's predisposition for a particular genetic disease or disorder."2) 
However, he argues that this narrow definition bas "the disadvantage of being easy 
to circumvent, intentionally or not."3)
Genetic information can corne frorn many sources other than DNA tests. 
Tests for carrier status of Tay-Sachs disease, sickle-cell anemia, and 
APOE status, for example, have all been routinely done, in the past or in 
the present, on proteins,. rot on DNA. Genetic variations involved in 
these conditions lead the body to produce slightly différent proteins, 
which can be separated out and tested for without dealing with DNA. 
Those "genetic tests," and' others, are routinely done without using any 
DNA.4)
2) Henry T. Greely, Genotype Discrimination: The Conmplex Case.fbr Sonie Legislative Protection, 
   149 U. PA. L. REV. 1483, 1495 (2001) (quoting Wis. STAT. ANN. § 631.89(1) (West 1997)).
3) Id. 
4) Id.
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  Greely also points out the problem of the broader version of the narrow 
definition represented by Michigan's statute which defines genetic information as 
"information about gene
, gene product, or inherited characteristic derived from a 
genetic test" and a genetic test is defined as "the analysis of human DNA, RNA, 
chromosomes, and those proteins and metabolites used to detect heritable or 
somatic disease- related genotypes or karyotypes for clinical purpose." 5)
[S]ome genetic information" can be obtained without doing any tests for 
the purpose of identifying genetic variations.... A pediatrician can, with 
great accuracy, diagnose whether a child has the chromosomal disorder 
Down syndrome without doing any biochemical tests, through the child's 
appearance and, later, behavior.... similarly, the family history that is 
part of any good physician's examination reveals some probabilistic 
genetic information. A perron with a parent who died of Huntington 
disease has a fifty percent chance of carrying the Huntington allele. A 
person with three or four close relatives, on the same side of her family, 
who had early-onset breast or ovarian cancer has a much higher than 
average chance of carrying a mutated BRCA 1 or BRCA 2 gene.6)
  Suter also addresses a shortcoming in defining genetic information narrowly by 
lirniting it to only the results of a genetic test or DNA analysis:
[N]ot all genetic information cornes from genetic test or DNA analysis. 
Indeed, of the over 10,000 catalogued genetic diseases, genetic tests exist 
for only a few hundred. Most genetic information . . . cornes from 
clinical evaluations, nongenetic tests, and family and medical history. As 
a result, those narrow definitions are under-inclusiveness, leaving 
unprotected a great deal of relevant and significant genetic information. 
For example, a family history of Huntington disease (HD), which 
indicates a fifty percent risk of the condition and is precisely the kind of 
predictive information that people want to protect, would not fall within 




Id (quoting MICH. ComP. LAws ANN. § 550.1401 (West 2000)). 
Id. at 1496. 
Sonia M. Suter, The Allure and Peril ofGenetics Exceptionalisnr: Do We Need Special Genetics 
Legislation?, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 669, 702 (2001).
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                b. Problems in Broad Definition 
  Greely points out the problem of the broad definition of genetic information. 
When he mentions broad definition, it means
information about inherited genes or chromosomes, and of alterations 
thereof, whether obtained from an individual or family member, that is 
scientifically or medically believed to predispose an individual to 
disease, disorder or syndrome, or believed to be associated with a 
statistically significant increased risk of development of a disease, 
disorder or syndrome.8)
  Greely 
follows:
illustrates "an unintended feedback effect" of the broad definition as
If a person bas been diagnosed with sickle-cell anemia, that is conclusive 
evidence that she carries two copies of a gene with the particular sickle-
cell mutations. If this medical information is treated as genetic 
information because it yields inférences about genes, the broad definition 
effectively outlaws all consideration of medical conditions that have 
some probabilistic association with inherited genetic variations.9)
  Suter also points out the problem associated with the broad definitions of 
genetic information covering "information about genes, gene products, or inherited 
traits that may derive from an individual or family member," which is taken by 
some state legislatures in trying to avoid the shortcomings involved in the narrow 
definition. Suter notes that if we adopt the broad definition of genetic information, 
they also include "information about height, eye color, and sex, all of which are 
primarily genetic traits. . . . Moreover, they include information about conditions 
like heart disease, cancer, diabetes, and some mental illness, which have a genetic 
component."10) Therefore, as I will discuss the details later, she asserts that the 
broad definitions are "over-inclusive, protecting more information than was 
intended."11) 
  In sum, if genetic information is narrowly defined as limited only to DNA test
8) Henry T. Greely, supra note 2, at 1496-97 (citing DEL. CODE ANN. TIT 18, § 2317(a)(2) (2000)). 
9) Id. at 1497. 
10) Sonia M. Suter, supra note 7, at 703 (2001). 
11 ) Id.
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results excluding family history, genetic privacy is rot sufficiently protected and 
genetic discrimination cannot be prevented adequately. If genetic information is 
defined broadly enough to encompass all of the information about genetic luck, it is 
impossible to distinguish between genetic information and other medical 
information. The more genetic technology advances, the more difficult it will 
become to distinguish between them and find where the line is to be drawn. 
Therefore, in order to protect genetic privacy appropriately, the law should also 
protect he privacy of all predictive medical information as well as the so-called 
genetic information. This definitional quandary inherent in any of the genetic-
specific legislations will be discussed in detail in the next chapter. Before that, I 
will address below, some of the other key issues in drafting genetic anti-
discrimination statutes.
B. Affirmative Use of Favorable Genetic Information
  As the genetic tests become more advanced and the cost of tests becomes much 
less expensive, it is not hard to imagine that genetic tests will become common and 
some of the people who take genetic tests may fend that s/he has favorable genetic 
information and a clean bill of genetic makeup while some may fend abnormality or 
defects in her/his genes. Genetic tests may not only create "genetic under-class" 
but also create "genetic upper-class or genetic elite." Then, there seems to be one 
issue that has rot been paid much attention to in drafting genetic anti-discrimination 
laws: whether or not we should also legally ban taking into account an individual's 
favorable genetic information disclosed voluntarily in the insurance and 
employment settings. In other words, this is an issue related with the authorized 
disclosure of genetic information and so-called affirmative medical defenses. 
  According to Colin S. Diver and Jane Maslow Cohen, "[v]irtually all of the 
extant regulatory measures peak only to the issue of using genetic information to 
discriminate against individuals. They are silent about the use of genetic 
information to discriminate in favor of an individual."12) However, according to the 
survey conducted by William F. Mulholland II and Ami S. Jaeger on January 15, 
1999, "some states explicitly authorize insurance companies to consider genetic 
information voluntarily submitted by an applicant indicating favorable results."13)
12) Colin S. Diver & Jane Maslow Cohen, Genophobia: What Is Wrong With Genetic 
   Discrimination? 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1439, 1453 (2001). 
13) William F. Mulholland Il & Ami S. Jaeger, Comment, Genetic PrivacT and Discrimination: A 
   Survev of State Legislation, 39 JURIMETRICS J. 317, 319 (1999) (referring to state statutes uch as
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Mulholland and Jaeger note that "these statutes assume that insurers will respond to 
favorable test results by reducing premiums and increasing benefits, but they 
prohibit insurers from acting adversely in response to unfavorable results." 14) 
  The issue here is well illustrated by the following questions raised by Diver and 
Cohen.
Should a prohibition on the use of genetic information apply only to uses 
that disadvantage the subject? What if a person, perhaps previously 
thought o be at risk of a genetic disease, discovers, thanks to a genetic 
test, that she is not? Can an insurer use that information to place her in a 
more favorable risk classification? Should a key individual in a corporate 
hierarchy not be able to provide this kind of reassurance when she is 
being considered for a move to the top? . . . What, then, is to prevent 
insurers and employers from inferring that a failure to volunteer 
favorable information represents the existence of genetic bad news?15)
  However, they do not present extensive discussion on these questions. 
  Suppose that the laws prohibit or regulate only the insurers' disadvantageous 
usage of genetic information of the insureds and employees, then the insurance 
companies would not be able to force genetic tests or submission of genetic 
information but may release plans where insurance companies would not use 
genetic information adversely, such as denying eligibility or limiting coverage or 
increasing premiums etc., but instead would decrease the premiums if applicants or 
insureds voluntarily submit their favorable genetic information, that is, clean bill of 
genetic makeup found by voluntary genetic tests. Likewise, employers would not 
be able to force job applicants or current employees to undergo genetic tests or to 
submit genetic information or family history and would not consider genetic 
abnormality in any adverse way but instead may offer some advantage for 
applicants in the hiring or placement process or for employees in the promotion 
decision. In other words, this is the issue of whether or not the individuals who 
underwent genetic tests and found they did not have any serious genetic 
abnormalities or genetic predisposition to serious diseases can use such genetic 
clean bills of their health to receive some advantage in the insurance setting such as
   410 ILL. COMP. STAT. 
   Supp.1998)). Id. n.14. 
14) Id. 
15) Id.
ANN. § 513/20 (West 1993); IND_ CODE ANN. § 27-8-26-9 (Michie
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less expensive premiums, or in the employment setting to prove high possibility of 
their productivities and their ability for promotion. 
  Chetan Gulati addresses this question as affirmative medical defenses which 
"may lead to circumvention" of the genetic legislation
.16) According to Gulati, this 
"dilemma arises when ins
ureds. attempt to use a genetic clean bill of health to 
secure lower premiums."17) Gulati states:
[I]magine that an insurer is allowed to differentiate on the basis of family 
history and thus charges high insurance rates to a child whose parent 
died of Huntington's disease. If that individual obtains screening and 
can prove that he does not have the Huntington's gene, could he then 
bargain for a normal rate?' 8)
  Gulati notes that "[s]tate statutes based on the Unfair Trade Practices Act 
(UTPA) may allow, or even require, insurers to charge this insured a lower rate." 19) 
And Gulati adds, "[i]t seems that it would clearly be "unfair discrimination" to 
charge someone a rate based on an actuarial estimate when that individual had 
proof that they would not get the disease in anticipation of which his/her rates were 
being set at a higher level."201 
  However, Gulati well addresses the plausible consequences of allowing 
affirmative medical defenses as follows:
If individuals are allowed to use affirmative medical defenses, the 
consequence will be that those who do not use these defenses will pay 
higher rates. If genetic screening becomes widespread, it is possible that 
the majority of people who do not use affirmative medical defenses will 
be those for whom the results of the screen would be no defense at all. 
Of course, those who do not get tested would also be differentiated 
against making the price of not being tested very high. As such, more 
and more people will be induced to forego their desire not to get tested
16) Chetan Gulati, Genetic Antidiscrimination Laws In Health Insurance: A Misguided Solution, 4 
   QUINNIPIAC HEALTH L.J. 149, 193 (2001). 
17) Id. at 193. 
18) Id. at 193-94. 
19) Id. at 194 (referring to Model Unfair Trade Practice Act § 4(g)(1) (Nat'l Ass'n Ins. Comm'rs 
  1993). 
20) Id.
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and to undergo genetic screening in the hopes that they will have a clean 
bill of genetic health and thereby qualify for a lower premium. Taken to 
its logical conclusion, the scenario is one in which many of those with 
genetic predispositions to disease end up being price differentiated 
against.21)
Natalie E. Zindorf also addresses the problem of the issue. She argues that
some state statutes provide that individuals may submit favorable genetic 
test results. Although a statute allowing insurers to consider such test 
results appears to benefit consumers on its face, it ultimately harms most 
consumers in the long run. ... As a result, the only way premiums can be 
decreased for individuals submitting favorable results is by raising rates 
for the entire applicant pool and lowering costs to the test takers. 
Consequently, the people that refrain from genetic testing or receive 
unfavorable test results will bear the burden of paying higher 
premiums.22)
  Mark A. Hall also is one of the few commentators who address this issue. He 
articulates the issue here as follows:
For instance, a person with a family history of Huntington's Disease has 
a fifty percent chance of having a debilitating degenerative neurological 
disease. This individual may have great difficulty obtaining both life and 
health insurance because of the clinical record of their first degree 
relatives. A genetic test that shows they in fact have the gene and so 
increases the probability to 100% would not make them much worse off, 
but a test that shows the opposite would reduce their risk to virtually 
nothing and so could greatly benefit their insurability. Would these laws 
bar such favorable use? If so, have they had that effect?23)
Based on the observation from the interviews to insurers conducted by Hall, he
21) Id. 
22) Natalie E. Zindorf, Comment, Discrimination in the 21st Centuiy: Protecting the Priva(,~y of 
   Genetic Information in Entploynient and Insurance, 36 TULSA L.J. 703, 720 (2001). 
23) Mark A. Hall, Legal Rules and Industrv Norms: The Impact of Laias Restricting Health Insurers' 
   Use of'Genetic Information, 40 JURHMETRICS J. 93, 118 (1999).
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states that "[n]one of the few insurer subjects we asked had given these issues any 
thought, so it appears that favorable use of genetic test results has not arisen very 
often."24) Hall also states that "the few insurer subjects and regulators who 
addressed this issue all agreed that, logically, if the law prohibits adverse use of 
genetic information, it should also prohibit favorable use." This is because 
"[u]nderwriters cannot look only at the positive side of a potential source of 
information. They must either consider both sides, or disregard it altogether. This is 
not only dictated by insurers' notions of what is fair, but by practical realities."25) 
  Hall gives a simple but good example for this reasoning:
Consider, for instance, allowing younger applicants to disclose their age 
but prohibiting insurers from inquiring about age. Insurers would simply 
assume that anyone who does not volunteer the information is not young. 
Therefore, to preclude age discrimination in rating, states must prohibit 
any consideration of age, both positive and negative.26)
  Hall also notes that "[t]his logic may not apply with the saure force to risk 
factors that only a few applicants have, such as a single, rare gene defect."27) This 
is because "[c]onsidering the Huntington's Disease example above, it may in fact 
be feasible for only those with favorable test results to reveal them to insurers ince 
those with a family history who do not reveal their results are already regarded as 
being at greatly increased insurance risk based merely on family history."28) He 
goes on to state that "[t]hus, a few states explicitly allow insurance applicants to 
voluntarily submit favorable genetic test results, or they ban only adverse use."29) 
  However, he argues that "as more and more genetic conditions become 
identifiable, it is more likely that greater portions of the population will be able to 
demonstrate hat they are genetically favored, and so allowing favorable use would 
undermine the goal of preventing wide scale genetic discrimination."30> 
  Some might argue that banning the use of favorable genetic information 
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disease but are not actually positive, of an opportunity for affirmative medical 
defenses to show their clean bills of genetic markers and therefore, they are not 
allowed to buy an insurance policy at an affordable price. In other words, it 
exacerbates otherwise avoidable discrimination because the law which prohibits 
considering favorable genetic information also results in preventing such people 
with an adverse family history from having access to insurance or obtaining it at an 
affordable price. However, this argument seems to have a flaw because it has a 
fallacy in which it presupposes an unregulated insurance market. If the law bans 
any use of genetic information regardless of whether it is favorable or unfavorable, 
the person who has an adverse family history but actually has a clean bill of genetic 
markers can buy an insurance policy at the saure price as others regardless of 
whether or not s/he shows favorable genetic information. 
  Consequently, if the purpose of the genetic legislation is to protect individuals 
against treating some individuals with gene defects adversely, to use favorable 
genetic information of some genetically lucky individuals in order to get advantage 
should also be banned because if the law allows the use of genetic information 
favorably, it eventually results in almost the saure adverse effects for the 
individuals who do not submit their favorable genetic information. Non-
submissions imply that there is a high possibility that they have unfavorable genetic 
information. Treating persons who proue to have clean genetic bills favorably 
means that the person who does not submit such a certificate would be treated 
comparatively disadvantageously. Accordingly, if the purpose to enact genetic 
anti-discrimination law is to prevent genetic discrimination and to ban treating 
some genetically unlucky individuals adversely, any law which does not regulate 
using favorable genetic information in a favorable way bas a loophole in its 
protection. And this means that the problem in genetic discrimination is not only 
unauthorized or forced disclosure of genetic information but also some type of 
voluntary and authorized disclosure of genetic information with informed consent.
C. Authorized Disclosure and Regulatory Strategy: Front- / End-loading 
  Approach
  When we analyze and review the issues with regard to genetic-specific anti-
discrimination statutes, as an analytical frame of reference, it seems very beneficial 
to examine the différent approaches of the regulatory strategy presented by 
Lawrence O. Gostin and James G. Hodge. In this subsection I examine the 
"authorized disclosure" issue in the light of regulatory strategy of legislation .
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  According to them, these state legislations can be characterized as divided into 
three différent approaches in their regulatory protections: Front-loading approach; 
Information Management approach; and End-loading or Harm Avoidance approach. 
Under the Front-loading approach, "legislation impedes the ability to generate 
genetic information by placing restrictions on testing (e.g., informed consent 
requirements)."31) They refer to this approach as front-loading because "they 
provide individual protection up-front, before genetic information is produced. ,32) 
Under the Information Management approach, "laws regulate the collection, use, 
storage, and disclosure of genetic information. "33) And under the third approach, 
Harm Avoidance or End-loading approach, "states permit use and disclosure of 
genetic data, but prohibits certain entities from discriminating based on a genetic 
status and prohibit certain disclosures to prevent individual discrimination."34) 
While the Front-loading and Information Management approaches focus mainly on 
the generation and collection of the genetic information, the Harm Avoidance or 
End-loading approach regulates mainly the coverage or application such as whether 
it applies to group health insurance plans or individual plans. Accordingly, if the 
statute takes the former approach and defines genetic information as narrowly 
limited to only genetic test results and excludes family history, then there are many 
legal loopholes in discriminating against insureds in the underwriting process. 
  Here, I would like to consider the issue of "authorized isclosure" of genetic 
information as an example where the approach of regulatory strategy becomes 
crucial. Generally, genetic-specific anti-discrimination statutes ban only 
"unauthorized" disclosure and they do not prohibit "voluntary" and "authorized" 
disclosure of genetic information. Therefore, the issue of "authorized" disclosure 
has received little public and scholarly attention. However, what is "authorized/ 
unauthorized" itself and how to achieve the due process of getting authorization 
(how to eliminate economic and psychological pressures which force authorization, 
etc.) itself should be the debating issue. Moreover, as I have pointed out in the 
previous subsection, to disclose favorable genetic information voluntarily (that is, 
authorized disclosure) has adverse ripple effects on preventing genetic 
discrimination against other people who want to but cannot give favorable genetic 
information.
31) Lawrence 0. Gostin & James G. Hodge, Jr., Genetic Privacy and the Lax,• An End To Genetics 
   Exceptionalisni, 40 Jurimetrics J. 21, 22, 47-48 (1999). 
32) Id. at 22, 47. 
33) Id. at 22, 48- 49. 
34) Id. at 47, 49.
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  Charles J. Sykes observes that "most attempts by state legislatures te, protect 
genetic privacy have proven to be week and inadequate."35) This is so because 
although "many of the laws lirait the ways in which employers can use the 
information, they do not actually restrict access to the information."36) He notes:
Most of the legislation seeks to prevent [only] unlawful, inadvertent, and 
unauthorized disclosure of genetic information . . . a much more 
significant problem is the authorized disclosure of genetic information. 
As a condition of employment or insurance, individuals can still be 
required to execute a release authorizing the disclosure of medical 
(including genetic) information. 37)
  Thus, Sykes argues that "if the goal of such legislation is to ensure privacy, then 
the focus of legislation cannot be limited simply to how the information is used-it 
must be on restricting access to the information in the first place."38j 
  Mark A. Rothstein is also one of the few commentators who addresses this issue 
seriously. He asserts that "the bigger problem is the authorized disclosure of 
genetic information. "39) This is so because
under the American with Disability Act, as well as the laws in virtually 
all the states, after an employer makes a conditional offer of 
employment, it is lawful for the employer to require as a condition of 
employment that the individual sign a blanket release authorizing the 
disclosure to the employer of all the individual's medical records. 40)
  The employer is "able to obtain genetic information" even if the law makes it 
"unlawful for an employer to perform a genetic test
, and ... use the results of a 
genetic test to discriminate in employment"41) because ordinary medical records 
"would include the individual's genetic information ."42) Therefore, Rothstein
35) CHARLES J. SYKES, THE END OF PRIVACY 132 (St. Martin's Press 1999). 
36) Id. 
37) Id. at 132-33 (emphasis in original). 
38) Id. at 132 (emphases added). 
39) Mark A. Rothstein, Why Treating Genetic Information Separately Is a Bad Idea, 4 TEX. REV. L. & 
   POL. 33, 35 (1999). 
40) Id. at 35-36. 
41) Id. at 35. 
42) Id. at 36.
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concludes that "[u]nless we prevent employers from getting access to the 
information, merely labeling the use of the [genetic] information as unlawful is of 
very little value indeed."43) He points out one ultimate question which law makers 
sometimes lose sight of in drafting genetic anti-discrimination laws but which 
requires further discussion, that is, "under what circumstances i it appropriate for 
third parties, which would include employers, health insurance companies, 
disability insurance companies, long-term care insurance companies, etc., to 
consider medical information about individuals' current health status or that 
predicts their future health status?"44) 
  As has been seen, the real issue is not whether the law adequately restricts 
unauthorized isclosure of genetic information of the applicants, insureds and 
employees, but the vert' content of the authorized and unauthorized isclosure. 
Therefore, even though the law sufficiently bans unauthorized isclosure, if the law 
makes a voluntary or authorized isclosure legal, insurers and employers easily can 
fend a big loophole. Here again there is the same structure that I have pointed out in 
the discussion on the affirmative use of favorable genetic information in the 
previous subsection. Moreover, it should be noted that, as discussed before, in 
order to get legal protection, for example, under the ADA, it is the employee's 
burden of proof that s/he was discriminated against on the basis of genetic 
abnormality, however it is sometimes very hard to prove it, especially in the case 
where discriminatory use was made in the process of selecting job applicants at the 
pre-employment s age. Therefore, the Front-loading regulation which strictly bans 
access to (authorized disclosure of) genetic information is indispensable to 
sufficiently protect genetic privacy and prohibit genetic discrimination.
43) Id. at 35. 
44) Id. at 36.
214 OSAKA UNIVERSITY LA WREVIEW [No. 53:199
             III. Practical Flaws of Legislation: 
         Practical Problems of Genetic Exceptionalism 
- Can we draw a clear line between genetic and non-genetic information? -
  As I mentioned before,45) currently most of the states have enacted their own 
genetic-specific anti-discrimination statutes in employment and insurance in order 
to make up for the legal loopholes and limited sporadic protections provided by the 
existing federal laws, but their coverage and forms vary significantly state by state. 
And this inconsistency of protection for genetic information on the state level has 
urged a comprehensive federal level genetic-specific anti-discrimination law, and 
indeed many bills have been introduced in the U.S. Congress. 
  However, none of these attempts have succeeded so far. In my view, both of the 
reasons why state statutes vary widely and why many proposed bills failed to be 
passed are mainly resulted from the practical and normative problems of the so 
called "Genetic Exceptionalism." Genetic Exceptionalism is a principle which 
asserts that genetic information is substantially différent from non-genetic 
information, and therefore, a fine can be drawn somewhere in between genetic 
information and other medical information. Indeed, no genetic-specific anti-
discrimination legislation can be drafted without defining the scope and meaning of 
"genetic information" and every such attempt more or less is based on the 
assumption of Genetic Exceptionalism. The inconsistency of the state statutes 
seems to reflect the fact that it is difficult to define genetic information and there 
are many différent views on where to draw the line to fix the scope of genetic 
information. 
  Many failed attempts to enact a comprehensive genetic-specific anti-
discrimination federal law are sometimes explained as owing to the strong political 
lobby by the health insurance industry such as the Health Insurance Association of 
America and large employer groups such as the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and 
the National Association of Manufacturers.46) In my opinion, however, a more 
fundamental theoretical explanation can be obtained by examining the arguments
45) Legal Protection Restricting Genetic Discrimination in U.S.A., 53 OSAKA UNIv. LAw REV. (2006). 
46) Louise M. Slaughter, The Genetic Discrimination in Health Insurance and Employment Act: H.R. 
   602, 18 N.Y.L. SCH. J. Hum. RTS. 1, 7-8 (2001) (Citing William Roberts, Daschle Urges U.S. 
   Senate Panel to Ban Genetic Discrimination, BLOOMBERG NEws, July 25, 2001; the statement of 
   Harold P. Coxon, Shareholder in the National Labor and Employment Law Firm Ogletree, 
   Deakins, Nash, Smoak & Stewart, P.C., Genetic Information in the Workplace Hearing Before 
   Senate Health, Education, Labor & Pensions, 107th Cong. (2000)).
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against genetic exceptionalism. In other words, failure to enact a comprehensive 
federal aw is ultimately explained as a flaw derived from genetic exceptionalism 
inherent in any genetic-specific legislation. In this Section, I will review 
respectively the difficulty in defining genetic information (the practical problem of 
genetic exceptionalism) and inequality between the person who suffers from a 
genetic disease and the person who suffers from a non-genetic disease (normative 
problem of genetic exceptionalism). 
  It is stated in the Introduction of the model Genetic Privacy Act of 1995 that 
"[t]he Act is based on the premise that genetic information is different from other 
types of personal information in ways that require special protection."471 Virtually 
ail the genetic privacy laws or genetic anti-discrimination statutes and their 
proponent arguments which assert hat genetic privacy requires special protection 
by law presuppose that genetic information has unique characteristics to a 
substantial degree, and therefore, it is different from other kinds of personal 
information. Accordingly, one important ask to evaluate the genetic-specific anti-
discrimination laws lies in exploring the question of "what is genetic information?" 
The answer to this question decisively affects the evaluation of the genetic-specific 
anti-discrimination laws. 
   In my previous article, 48) I identified the nature and character of genetic 
information by reviewing the arguments of "genetic exceptionalism."49) The 
agenda I examine in this subsection are as follows: I examine whether genetic
47) George J. Annas, Leonard H. Glantz, & Patricia A. Roche, Genetic Privacy Act and Conimentary 
   (1995) available at <http://www.ornl.gov/TechResources/Human Ge ome/resource/privacy/ 
   privacyl.html> (last visited Nov. 17, 2000); also available at <http:// www.ornl.gov/hgmis/ 
   resource/privacy/privacyl.html>(Iast vi ited June 17, 2002). Also see George J. Annas, Leonard 
   H. Glantz & Patricia A. Roche, Drqfting the Genetic Privacy Act: Science, Policy, and Practical 
   Considerations, 23 n4 J. L. MED & ETHICS 360 (1995); Patricia Roche et al., The Genetic Privacy 
   Act: A Proposai for National Legislation, 37 JURIMETRICS J. 1 (1996). 
48) Privacy of Genetic Information, 52 OSAKA UNIv. LAw REV. pp. 75-105 (2005). 
49) See, e.g., Thomas H. Murray, Genetic Exceptionalism and "Future Diary ": 1s Genetic 
   Information Different.from Other Medical Information?, in GENETIC SECRETS: PROTECTING PRIVACY 
   AND CONFIDENTIALITY IN THE GENETIC ERA 60 (Mark A. Rothstein ed., Yale Univ. Press1997); 
   Lawrence O. Gostin & James G. Hodge Jr., Genetic Privacy and the Law: An End to Genetics 
   Exceptionalism, 40 JURIMETRICS J. 21 (1999); Zita Lazzarini, What Lessons Can We Learn Froni 
   the Exceptionalisni Debate (Finally)?, 29 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 149 (2001); Glenn McGee, 
   Foreward: Genetic Exceptionalism, 11 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 565 (1998); Lainie Friedman Ross, 
   Genetic Exceptionalism vs. Paradigni Shift: Lessons From HIV, 29 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 141 
   (2001); Natalie E. Zindorf, supra note 22; Jennifer S. Geetter, Coding.for Change: The Powerof 
   the Hunian Genonie ta Transfbrni the American Health Insurance Systen:, 28 AM. J.L. & MED. 1 
  (2002).
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information can be distinguished from other kinds of medical information in a 
feasible manner and demonstrate that it is very hard to draw a clear line between 
the two as a practical matter. And then, I consider how this creates definitional 
difficulties of genetic information and results in over- and under-inclusiveness of 
the genetic anti-discrimination statutes which intend to give special legal protection 
to genetic information.
A. Definitional Dilemma: Two-Bucket Quandary 
  - Can We Distinguish Genetic Information from Other Medical 
  Information? -
  Mark A. Rothstein, observes two practical reasons why "treating genetic 
information separately is a bad idea."50) One is impossibility to develop a working 
definition and another is economic unfeasibility. 
  The first reason comes from his actual experience when he was trying to define 
genetic information for enacting legislation in Texas that purports to prohibit 
discrimination in employment and insurance. He notes that "[i]f you define genetic 
information as the results of a DNA-based test, . . . you are leaving out a 
tremendous amount of information that is not derived from a genetic test."51) If 
there is a notation in your medical record stating that one of your parents died of 
Huntington's disease, we can see that you "have a fifty-percent risk of developing 
this invariably fatal disorder" without having any genetic test. He asserts that "[i]f 
we protect people who have a positive test for the Huntington's disease mutation 
and don't protect" those "with only the medical record, that seems illogical."52) 
Moreover, he also observes that in order to avoid this problem with a narrow 
definition of genetic information, if we adopt a definition broad enough to include 
ail genetic information "derived from an individual or an individual's family 
members, in addition to the results of genetic tests,"53) it poses another problem.
He goes on to state that "[w]e are now discovering enetic components in the most 
common multi-factorial disorders: heart disease, cancer osteoporosis, epilepsy, 
diabetes,"54) and "[i]f we included predisposition to any of those within the ambit of 
genetic information, and then took certain actions, such as prohibiting employers
50) Mark A. Rothstein, supra note 39, at 33. 
51) Id. at 33. 
52) Id. 
53) Id. 
54) Id. at 34.
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from getting access to 'genetic information,' in many instances employers that have 
employees doing very dangerous jobs would not have the information ecessary to 
select workers appropriately."55) He states that "if we ever could separate genetic 
from non-genetic medical information, that day bas long since passed, and 
everything that we discover in the future is going to make the distinction even more 
difficult."56) 
  Murray calls these difficulties the dilemma of the "two-bucket theory" of 
disease. He states that "there are two buckets-one labeled 'genetic,' the other 
labeled "non-genetic'-and we should be able to toss every disease and risk factor 
into one of the two. So, Huntington disease goes into the 'genetic' bucket and 
getting run over by a truck goes into the 'non-genetic' one."57) However, he asserts 
"many diseases and risks don't fit neatly into either bucket."58) He takes up the 
cases of breast cancer, heart disease and cholesterol level. He observes:
Some cases of breast cancer have strong genetic mots, but others have no 
clear genetic connection. For that matter, not every woman with a 
mutated BRCAI gene will develop breast cancer. And some apparent risk 
factors have little or no link to genetics. Similar complexity exists for 
heart disease: cholesterol is a risk factor, and one's cholesterol level can 
be modified by diet, exercise, and other factors; but our genes have much 
or more to do with the level of cholesterol circulation in our blood as our 
environment or behavior. Into which bucket, then should we toss breast 
cancer? Heart disease? Cholesterol level?59)
  Another difficulty with genetic exceptionalism, Murray observes, is that "it 
seemed practically infeasible to divide medical records into those portions that were 
genetic ... from those portions that were nongenetic."60) This is because we don't 
have a feasible measure "to identify and keep separate genetic information from 
nongenetic information in the medical record."61)
Charles J. Sykes, a journalist and the author of THE END OF PRIVACY, also notes:
55) Id. 
56) Id. 
57) Murray, supra note 49, at 68. 
58) Id. 
59) Id. at 67-68. 
60) Id. at 68. 
61) Id.
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  The reality is that much of what we consider routine medical 
information has a genetic component, including our family histories. As 
the science advances, it seems likely that genetic testing and information 
will increasingly be integrated into everyone's medical records as a 
standard part of diagnostic tests and medical profiles. Genetic 
information is already so deeply embedded into the practice of medical 
underwriting that it seems both impractical and unlikely that any attempt 
to somehow screen it out or segregate the material could ever be adopted 
in the real world. As a practical matter, doctors would have to edit each 
and every medical record, chart and history, to delete any reference to 
family histories or other genetic information. This would not only be 
time-consuming, and expensive, it would likely prove to be 
impossible. 62)
  Another reason why Rothstein thinks it is impossible to regulate genetic 
information separately from other medical information is that it would be 
economically infeasible. He asserts that "[p]resumably, certain information from 
medical records would be disclosed, while other information would not. Those in 
the health care industry tell me that making such distinctions and separating 
information, when it is debatable whether numerous condition are subject to 
disclosure, would be a logical nightmare."63)
  Sonia M. Suter also demonstrates how difficult it is to draw the fine between 
genetic and nongenetic information:
Genes play some role in all disease, but environment plays a role as well, 
even with genetic diseases.... AIDS is a classic nongenetic ondition 
caused by infection with HIV. Yet genetics is crucial with respect to 
whether the infection will cause illness, how soon one becomes ill, and 
how quickly the disease progresses. Conversely, PKU [Phenylketonuria], 
a classic genetic condition, caused by two recessive non-functional 
genes, is highly influenced by environmental factors. If you eliminate 
phenylalanine from the diet, the symptoms of PKU will not develop.64)
62) CHARLES J. SYKES, supra note 35, at 132. 
63) Mark A. Rothstein, supra note 39, at 34. 
64) Sonia M. Suter, supra note 7, at 703 (alteration added).
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  Suter observes that "no sharp line divides genetic from nongenetic information. 
Instead, there is a great deal of overlap between these categories, making line-
drawing exceedingly difficult."65) 
  According to Suter, the rationale for genetics legislation can be divided into two 
categories: 1) concerns related to genetic discrimination; and 2) concerns related to 
privacy interests.66) At the heart of the former rationale-to prevent genetic 
discrimination, Suter states there is a fairness argument: "We cannot control the 
genes we inherit. Like race, our genetic information is an immutable trait, for which 
we should not be penalized."67) Also "certain characteristics of genetic information 
make it particularly vulnerable to insurance or employment discrimination."68) And 
"genetic information is prone to discrimination because it can be misunderstood. ,69) 
Additionally, "genetic discrimination can lead to forms of racial, ethnie, or gender 
bias when discrimination is based on a gene that predominantly affects discrete 
groups. For example, the breast cancer genes are most common in women of 
Askenazi Jewish descent."7() According to Suter, the latter rational, privacy 
interest, is based on public concern; "public fears of genetic discrimination may 
prevent people from undergoing valuable genetic testing or participating in genetics 
research."71) 
  Suter argues that with regards to these rationales for genetics legislation, the 
dichotomy between genetic and nongenetic information makes no différence.
They [rationales] do not apply te, all genetic information, but more 
importantly, they apply equally to other types of medical information. In 
short, there is a grossly imperfect fit between the justifications for 
carving out special protections for genetic information and the category 
of genetic information because genetic information is both over- and 
under-inclusive with respect o its legislative purposes. This imprecise 
fit, particularly the under-inclusiveness, uggests the line between 
genetic and nongenetic information is not morally compelling.72)
65) Id. ai 701. 
66) Id. at 706. 
67) Id. 




72) Id. ai 705.
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  Accordingly, any genetic legislation which gives special legal protections for 
genetic information is both over-inclusive and under-inclusive. In the subsequent 
subsections, I will respectively review the details of her arguments on over-
inclusiveness and under-inclusiveness as a fundamental flaw of the genetic-specific 
legislation.
B. Over- Inclusiveness
  Sonia M. Suter asserts that "it is virtually impossible fully to distinguish genetic 
information from other medical information."73) This is because of the fact that 
"[g]enetic information and medical information are 'so intimately intertwined that 
they cannot be segregated legislatively or by regulation in any way that would 
prove operationally feasible."'74) And Suter argues that "the various attempts to 
define genetic information so as to distinguish it from other medical information are 
inevitably unsatisfactory, suffering from under- or over-inclusiveness [in the light 
of their intended scope of protections]."75) 
  According to Suter, genetic legislation is over-inclusive in regards to its 
legislative purposes because of the following reasons; "[1] [c]oncerns about the 
lack of control over one's genes, [2] the high level of predictiveness of genetic 
information, and [3] its stigmatizing and hidden features do not apply equally to all 
genetic information. "76) 
  First of all, sheasserts that "[a]lthough we cannot control the genes that we 
inherit, we can sometimes control factors that influence the degree to which genes 
affect our future health."77) She gives several supporting examples for this: "[I]f 
one has two copies of the Bene for PKU, and phenylalanine is removed from the 
diet, the symptoms of PKU will not develop. Similarly if one has the gene for colon 
cancer, one may reduce the risk of developing cancer by undergoing regular 
endoscopies, dietary regimes, or surgery."78) 
  Moreover, second, she states that "[m]any genes are only predisposing and do
73) Sonia M. Suter, supra note 7, at 701. 
74) Id. at 702 (quoting David Korn, Genetic Privacy, Medical Information Privacy, and the Use of 
   Hunian Tissue Specimens in Research, in GENETIC TESTING AND THE USE OF INFORMATION 40-41 
   (Clarisa Long ed., 1999)). 
75) Id. (alteration added). 
76) Id. at 709. 
77) Id. 
78) Id.
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not guarantee that the condition will develop"79) except for some limited genetic 
information such as Huntington disease (She asserts that Huntington disease should 
"be the exception
, not the rule" because it represents a small number of all genetic 
link diseases).8() She states that "most genetic information does not predict future 
health risk. For example, information that someone carries a single copy of a 
recessive gene may increase the chances of having an affected child, but it does not 
increase the risk of future disease in the carrier."81) 
  Third, Suter asserts that genetics legislation is over-inclusive in regards to its 
stigmatizing and hidden features. For instance, "[g]enetics legislation is also over-
inclusive with respect to concerns that it addresses race- or gender-based 
discrimination" because "[w]hile some genetic diseases are more prevalent in 
certain racial or ethnic groups or a particular sex, most are not."82) Furthermore, 
she notes that "genetics legislation is over-inclusive to the extent hat it is based on 
the 'uniqueness' argument" because "the vast majority of genetic information is not 
unique. We share more than 99.9% of our genetic information with others and even 
99% with chimpanzees."83) Suter further argues that "not all genetic information is 
highly sensitive and stigmatizing. Blood type is neither sensitive nor 
stigmatizing."84) Also she goes on to state that "a great deal of information is not 
hidden from us and others. Whether we have two X chromosomes or an X and Y is 
readily apparent, as is eye color, a genetically inherited trait."85) Moreover, "some 
genetic conditions, such as hemochromatosis and PKU, are treatable."86) 
  Accordingly, "it is not genetic information per se that is necessarily susceptible 
to misuse. Rather certain kinds of genetic information-particularly predictive or 
predisposing genetic information, or information that increases genetic risks in 
family members- raise concerns of discrimination. "87) Hence, "it may be 
unnecessarily costly to restrict uses of genetic information that do not seem 
particularly susceptible to discriminatory uses."88) However, according to Suter, 
the problem of over-inclusiveness "can easily be ameliorated with some definitional
79) Id. 
80) Id. 
81) Id. 709-10. 




86) Id. at 710-11. 
87) Id. at 711. 
88) Id.
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fine-tuning," for example, by "limit[ing] protections to the categories of genetic 
information that seem particularly susceptible to misuse, such as asymptomatic, 
predictive, or predisposing genetic information or carrier status."89) Contrary to 
over-inclusiveness, Suter states that under-inclusiveness of legislation is more 
problematic and cannot be ameliorated by definitional fine-tuning. In the next 
subsection, let me present her arguments about under-inclusiveness.
C. Under Inclusiveness
  Suter doubts the notion that genes are not in our control 
factors are.
while nongenetic risk
Although we cannot control the genes we inherit, we cannot control a 
great many other risk factors, such as in utero exposures, environmental 
conditions, or drunk drivers, which may have profound effects on our 
future health. Moreover, many risk factors, which seem very much in 
one's control, may be less so than we imagine. Aedictive behavior is 
influenced by genetic elements, as well as many social elements outside 
of our control, such as family, socioeconomic status, and culture. 
Controlling one's weight, for example, is not solely a matter of 
willpower. Even addiction to smoking has genetic elements. Thus, 
genetics does not function satisfactorily as an exclusive category for 
risks outside our control.90)
  Accordingly, if we resort to the factor of "beyond our control" criteria as a basis 
of the legislation, to protect only genetic information is under-inclusive and 
protection for non-genetic medical information outside our control would be 
required as well. 
  Suter also points out that "genetic information is not alone in its predictive 
capacity." She notes that "[b]efore the advent of protease inhibitors, HIV infection 
virtually ensured the future development of AIDS. Similarly, significant asbestos 
exposure leads to a high risk of lung cancer. Worries that insurers or employers will 
discriminate based on genetic information apply equally to other medical 
information. "9 1) Moreover, she argues that "to the extent hat people view genetic
89) Id. 
90) Id. at 712. 
91) Id.
20061 KEY ISSUES AND PROBLEMS OF CENETIC ANTI-DISCRIMINATION LA WS 223
discrimination as a proxy for race or gender discrimination, protecting genetic 
information is under-inclusive. Racial discrimination has occurred through the use 
of other proxies for race."92) Furthermore, "concerns that fears of discrimination 
will prevent individuals from participating in medical research or treatment for 
conditions such as mental illness or cancer also justify the protection of other 
medical information."93) Thus, if we regard the predictive capacity of genetic 
information as a ground for enacting new legislation, protecting only genetic 
information is under-inclusive and legal protection should be provided for some 
kinds of similarly highly predictive nongenetic medical information as well. 
  Suter further asserts that genetics legislation is under-inclusive because the 
privacy concerns "also extend well beyond genetics."
Genetic information is not uniquely personal and revealing. Our life 
histories are as personal and revealing as our genetic code. One's 
culture, family, friends, education, career, beliefs, and dreams all reveal 
as much, if not more, about who we are and will become than our genes. 
Nor is genetic information uniquely unique. Other information is 
personally identifying. Old-fashioned fingerprints, dental analysis, iris 
scans, voice prints, handwritten signature measurements, and "esoteric 
biometrics" can identify individuals, as can other less high-tech 
information, such as social security numbers, addresses, phone numbers, 
and credit card numbers. Even more general information, such as 
neighborhood, age, occupation, marital status, and number and ages of 
children, can be identifying in the aggregate.94)
  Also she adds that "genetics is not the only mechanism to probe into past lives. 
Other techniques [such as bone analysis, infrared light and computer imaging 
software, etc. also] have been used to explore the personal history of the 
deceased."95) 
  Furthermore, she asserts that not only genetic information has a sensitive or 
stigmatizing nature.
[N]ongenetic information may be highly sensitive or stigmatizing,
92) Id. at 712-13. 
93) Id. at 713. 
94) Id. (emphases added). 
95) Id.
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perhaps even more so than most genetic information. Information 
regarding sexually transmitted iseases, mental illness, reproductive 
history, addiction, marital status, or a history of abuse might influence 
how potential partners, insurers, employers, and society view and treat 
us. Indeed, because people view genes as outside our control, genetic 
information might be less stigmatizing than other information associated 
with behavior-such as a history of sexually transmitted iseases-and 
therefore less susceptible to moral judgment.96)
  Moreover, Suter states, "[n]or is genetic information unique in its capacity to be 
hidden risks such as viral infections, prenatal exposures, abnormal biochemical 
levels, and even environmental risks. Cancers may grow within our bodies long 
before we exhibit symptoms."97) 
  Suter points out that "genetic information is not the only information that is 
relevant o family members," and notes that "[w]hether someone in the family has 
tuberculosis, scarlet fever, or a sexually transmitted isease may tell us something 
about certain family members' risks. So relevant is this information to family 
members that courts have imposed duties on physicians to warn families of the 
infectious nature of the patient's disease."98) 
  Accordingly, Suter concludes that "genetic information is a seriously under-
inclusive category with respect o virtually all of the concerns motivating genetic 
legislation."99) As has been seen, Suter well demonstrates that the main reasons 
and nature which exclusively seem to belong to genetic information are also equally 
true of non-genetic information and therefore genetic legislation is inevitably and 
problematically under-inclusive with regard to its purposes. She regards this under-
inclusiveness as resulting in morally unacceptable unintended inequities. This is 
the normative problem of genetic-specific anti-discrimination laws, that is, the 
fundamental problem of Genetic Exceptionalism that I will address in detail in the 
next subsection by referring to the arguments presented by Suter.
96) Id. at 714 (emphases added). 
97) Id. 
98) Id. at 714-15 (2001) (referring to Skillings v. Allen, 173 N.W. 663, 664 (Minn. 1919)). 
99) Id. at 715.
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          IV. Theoretical Flaws of Legislation: 
      Normative Problems of Genetic Exceptionalism 
-Is it fair to treat people with genetic diseases differently from people 
                 with non-genetic diseases? -
Murray states:
[T]here was no good moral justification for treating genetic information, 
genetic diseases, or genetic risk factors as categorically différent from 
other medical information, diseases, or risk factors. If someone 
genuinely needed health tare, it did not matter whether one could find a 
genetic root for the disease or whether it was the product of nongenetic 
bad luck or accident.... Our need for health care in most cases will be 
the product of a complex mix of factors, genetic and nongenetic," 
[therefore] "[t]he distinction between genetic and nongenetic factors is 
not the crucial one.100)
  Even though we assume that a line could be drawn somewhere between genetic 
and non-genetic medical information and somewhat solve the practical problems in 
defining genetic information by creating many exceptions in order to ameliorate 
over- and under-inclusiveness with regard to the scope of the protection, genetic-
specific legislations still cannot escape from its normative problem discussed in this 
section. The most serions normative problem of genetic-specific legislation 
underlined by genetic exceptionalism is that its special protection only for "genetic 
information" leads to inequality and unfairness between the individuals with 
genetic abnormality and other predictive medical information, and also among the 
classes. Although this inequality has been mentioned by several commentators 
opposing the genetic anti-discrimination law,101) as far as I have surveyed more 
than one hundred articles published in the past ten years, it was not fully discussed 
until recently when Suter addressed this issue in her insightful article. Let us take a 
look at her arguments in detail.
100) Murray, supra note 49, at 69. 
101) See, e.g., Mark A. Rothstein, supra note 39, at 33. Colin S. Diver & Jane Maslow Cohen, supra 
   note 12, at 1460.
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A. Inequality 
  Problems
between People with Genetic and Non-genetic Health
  Suter gives an illustrative example which demonstrates how any legislation 
which prohibits discrimination based on only "genetic" information leads to 
inequities. She presents the following hypothetical situation.
Imagine that two women face an increased risk for breast cancer. The 
first woman, Jeannie, has a positive test for BRCA1, a gene associated 
with an increased risk of breast cancer and other cancers. This test result 
puts her at anywhere from a thirty-six percent to eighty-seven percent 
lifetime risk of breast cancer. The second woman, Eve, faces a 
significant risk of cancer, not based on a genetic test or family history, 
but on other factors or tests that suggest she bas a high predisposition. 
For example, she may have faced significant exposure to asbestos or she 
may have a precancerous condition that resulted from environmental 
exposures, which puts her at risks of cancer. Both women face a notable 
cancer risk, but one risk is perceived as genetic and the other as 
nongenetic. 1 02)
  Suter further assumes that in a state which has passed an anti-discrimination law 
banning insurance and employment discrimination based only on genetic 
information, if these two women are seeking coverage through individual insurance 
plans, they would be treated totally differently (unequally).
Legislation prohibiting insurance discrimination based on genetic 
information would cover Jeannie's risk, even under the narrowest 
definition of genetic information, but it would not cover Eve's. Eve 
might be denied insurance, but more likely, she would pay higher 
premiums to reflect her increased risk. However, Jeannie's premiums 
would not be raised to reflect her risk because, like others with genetic 
risk, her genetic risks would be subsidized by everyone in the insurance 
pool. In other words, Eve would "cover" her known increased risk, even 
as she helps subsidize Jennie's. This result is unjust because some known 
risks are subsidized and others are not. Moreover, there is no coherent
102) Sonia M. Suter, supra note 7, at 715-16.
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reason for that différence, except that one risk is "genetic" and the other 
is not.103)
  Rothstein also asserts that any laws or proposais which aim at regulating and 
protecting genetic information separately from other medical information are 
"illogical" and "ineffective."104) The first reason lie asserts is that there is no 
logicai reason to draw distinction between genetic disorders and other disorders. 
He gives a breast cancer case as an example:
  In a jurisdiction with a statute prohibiting discrimination in the 
insurance of an individual health insurance policy on the basis of a 
genetic test result, a woman who was asymptomatic, but had one of the 
breast cancer gene mutations, could not be denied access to health 
insurance, nor charged a higher rate. However, if that woman goes on to 
develop breast cancer, then the general health insurance laws in that state 
could apply. The woman could be assessed higher premiums, or, indeed, 
lier health insurance could be cut off entirely. 105)
  He considers the plausible counter-argument which may assert hat "[p]erhaps 
we could correct that situation by enacting another law that stated that women who 
develop genetic-based breast cancer also cannot be discriminated against."106) But, 
lie argues that it makes no sense because "[w]e would be protecting about five 
percent of breast cancer cases-those who have a genetic alteration associated with 
their breast cancer-and not protecting from discrimination the ninety-five percent 
of breast cancer cases whose cause we have not yet determined."107) 
  Suter notes that under the genetic-specific legislation, a similar inequality would 
happen also in the employment context: "Jeannie's job and promotions would be 
protected, but Eve's might be at risk, particularly if the employer had access to all 
other health information."' 08) And "[o]nce again no coherent reason justifies this 
disparity" she states.109)
103) Id. at 717. 
104) Mark A. Rothstein, supra note 39, at 35-36. 
105) Id. at 35. 
106) Id. 
107) Id. 
108) Id. at 717. 
109) Id. at 718.
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  Moreover, Suter points out inequalities and disparities with regards to "self-
determination, autonomy, and dignity interests" between Jeannie and Eve.
Both Jeannie and Eve have an interest in deciding for themselves 
whether to disclose their increased risk of cancer to others. In a state with 
only genetic privacy legislation, Jeannie would have greater, though not 
full, control over such disclosure than Eve. The fact that Jeannie's risk is 
"genetic" does not necessarily increase her interests in preventing 
disclosure. Indeed, Eve may feel more sensitive about her increased 
cancer risk, given that she bas no protection against discrimination based 
on this information. Again, no principled reason exists for this disparity. 
Jeannie's and Eve's interest in controlling disclosure of personal health 
information is equally powerful and therefore deserving of equal forms 
of protection. 110)
B. Inequality between the Classes
  Furthermore, Suter argues that genetic-specific legislation leads to not only 
inequality between the individuals with genetic and non-genetic abnormality, it also 
results in social inequality between the classes. She asserts:
  The most disturbing aspect of the under-inclusiveness of genetic 
legislation ... is that the unintended inequalities of genetics legislation 
exacerbate social inequalities. Although genetic risks transcend 
socioeconomic class, nongenetic risks frequently do not. Many 
nongenetic risks have sociological components related to poverty and 
environmental hazards, some of which are not in one's control. For 
example numerous studies demonstrate that people of color and low 
income communities face disproportionate environmental impacts in the 
United States. Some sources of such environmental risks include 
"hazardous waste sites
, incinerators, chemical factories, and sewage 
treatment plants," which are placed disproportionately in these lower-
income communities. . . . Continuous exposure to such environmental 
hazards poses increased risks of "cancer, asthma, chronic bronchitis, 
emphysema and other respiratory diseases, reproductive and birth
110) Id. at 719.
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defects, immunological problems, and neurological defects." In addition, 
low socioeconomic status is disproportionately associated with "virtually 
all of the chronic diseases that are the leading causes of mortality"; 
infectious diseases, such as HIV or tuberculosis; traumatic injuries and 
death; and developmental delay and other disabilities.111)
  As a result, the poor, which includes many minorities, are more likely 
to face nongenetic risks than the middle or upper classes.... If insurers, 
for example, can make actuarial decision on the basis of evidence of 
nongenetic risks, but not genetic risks, we allow discrimination that will 
disproportionately disadvantage these vulnerable populations. Or to put 
it differently, we ask the least advantaged to bear their own nongenetic 
risks alone, even as we ask everyone, including them, to subsidize 
genetic risks.112)
Suter continues to assert that
[g]iven that many environmental hazards, as well as other health risks, 
are linked to poverty and low socioeconomic status, there is reason to be 
concerned about the social impact of a policy that only protects genetic 
risks, but does not protect the risks that most profoundly affect the poor 
and minorities.113)
  She concludes that genetic-specific legislation disproportionately treats the mort 
vulnerable low socioeconomic class adversely.
[G]enetic discrimination is principally a concern of the middle to upper 
classes, who have financial resources for testing and jobs and insurance 
they fear losing. This group of well-educated, well-off individuals has 
lobbied heavily for genetics legislation. In contrant, the groups most 
vulnerable to health risks associated with poverty and environmental 
hazards do not have the saure political voice or cohesiveness. There is a 
danger that the strong political voice of the first group outshadows the
111) Id. at 719-20 (emphases added). 
112) Id. at 720 (emphasis added). 
113) Id. at 720-21.
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interests of more vulnerable, but less politically powerful groups. In 
short, genetic-specific legislation becomes another middle-class 
entitlement. 114)
C. Incrementalism: Plausible Defense for Genetic-Specific Legislation
  In sum, Suter argues that "genetic information is a simultaneously under- and 
over-inclusive category with respect to the policy concerns motivating genetic 
legislation."115) This is because "[n]ot all genetic information requires protective 
legislation, which makes genetic legislation over-inclusive. More importantly, a 
great deal of other medical information shares many of the features of genetic 
information that have inspired this legislation, which makes it dramatically under-
inclusive."116) And "[t]his under-inclusiveness . . . results in inequities between 
similarly situated individuals and . . . exacerbates clans inequities. . . Because 
genetics legislation only protects genetic information, those facing nongenetic risks 
will not be protected."117) "While genetic risks transcend socioeconomic lass, 
nongenetic risks frequently do not. The poor and minorities face a disproportionate 
degree of nongenetic, environmental risks and, therefore, are disproportionately 
disadvantaged by laws that protect against discrimination based only on genetic 
risks."118) 
  As has been seen, Suter points out the problems of genetic exceptionalism and 
strongly criticizes genetic-specific legislation. However, it should be noted that, for 
Suter, recognizing the practical and normative problems inherent in genetic 
exceptionalism does not mean that legal protection against genetic discrimination is 
not needed but rather ail sensitive and predictive medical information including 
some types of genetic information should be protected. Indeed, her intention is to 
point out that "the concerns motivating genetics legislation extend well beyond 
genetic information."' 19) Suter asserts:
Currently, our system has a default rule that allows insurers to access and 
use most medical information for underwriting purposes, with a few
114) Id. at 721. 




119) Id. at 724.
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exceptions for race, genetics, and, in some instances, gender. If policy 
makers understand that many risk factors are significantly outside of our 
control and predictive, the opposite default rule might be more 
appropriate. In other words, perhaps insurers should not be able to obtain 
or use most medical information for underwriting. 120)
  However, as the unsuccessful attempt of the Clinton administration's national 
large-scale health care reform in 1993-94 shows, in reality it is difficult to give 
legal protections for all predictive and sensitive medical information in the health 
insurance arena in the short run. Therefore, some "political realists" may argue as 
follows:
By urging reform with respect to genetics, one can move toward the 
ultimate goal of protecting all medical information, without directly 
placing on the table the fact that similar concerns apply to other medical 
information. Extending genetic protections to other medical information 
too soon, for example, might be at best, very difficult, and at worst, 
politically unwise. The better approach, the pragmatist would argue, is to 
open the door to reform with genetics legislation, for which there is 
widespread political and public support. Once the door is ajar, we can 
incrementally open it wider over time.121)
  Suter calls this strategy the incrementalism or the step-by-step olitical realists' 
approach and regards it as a plausible defense for the under-inclusiveness of
genetics legislation. Under the incrementalism, it is argued that "the protections 
created by genetics legislation will eventually apply to all medical information 
because genetic analysis will be so integral to every aspect of future medical 
records." 122) However, Suter "doubt[s] its ability to fulfill the promise of 
expanding the protections of genetic information to other medical information in 
light of the deeply entrenched perspective of genetics exceptionalism."123) While 
Suter admits exceptionalism could be an adequate strategy in some fields, she does 
not believe that genetic legislation could be one step toward larger reform. She 
believes that "[r]ather than being the first step toward broader eform with respect
120) Id. ai 744-45. 
121) Id. at 722. 
122) Id. 
123) Id. at 672.
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to insurance discrimination, employment discrimination, or privacy protections, 
genetics legislation might be the last step." 124) Since the motivation of genetics 
legislations is deeply entrenched by genetic exceptionalism, once such a law is 
enacted, legislators will have a false sense that they have solved the discrimination 
at issue. She argues:
As long as genetics legislation is largely understood as grounded in 
genetics exceptionalism, legislatures will think they have addressed the 
real problems, and they will not want to go further. Similarly, the public, 
media, and even many scientists will likely feel satisfied that genetics 
legislation has resolved the important issues.... As a consequence, once 
genetics legislation is in place, public support is likely to be anemic with 
respect to further refonn, and politicians may be reluctant to invest 
political capital in extending these protections beyond genetics.125)
  This scenario would likely happen when we take the following fact into account, 
she argues.
The group most attentive to the genetics exceptionalism perspective will 
be the more politically active middle and upper classes, whose primary 
concern is genetic discrimination. Because the broader concerns of the 
poor and minorities do not affect these groups, they are even less likely 
to advocate widening the scope of protections; their needs have been 
met. Instead, the group who would have the greatest self-interest in 
expanding genetics legislation-the poor and minorities-is least likely 
to have the political force and clout to effect such change. 126)
  Accordingly, she concludes that "when we consider both the social nones that 
reinforce genetics exceptionalism and the relative powerlessness of those who most 
benefit from broadening the reach of genetics legislation, it is easy to be pessimistic 
about the success of incrementalism."127) 
  A similar argument is presented by Chetan Gulati. It is argued that
124) Id. at 725. 
125) Id. at 726. 
126) Id. at 726-27. 
127) Id. at 727.
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genetic antidiscrimination laws placate the higher socioeconomic classes 
and help prevent more radical reforms and that eventually, faced with the 
realization that genetic antidiscrimination laws will fail, Americans will 
have to either reevaluate the ways in which health care is financed or 
they will have to accept the implications of a system that distributes 
health care goods according to wealth and predisposition to disease. 128)
  As I have demonstrated by referring to the arguments presented by many 
commentators, genetic-specific anti-discrimination laws have serious and 
inescapable problems which stem from genetic exceptionalism. As you may notice, 
we face a serious dilemma over the genetic discrimination issues. On one hand, 
virtually all feel that we desperately need a law to protect genetic privacy and 
prevent genetic discrimination; on the other hand, however, such genetic-specific 
anti-discrimination laws result in unintended unfair consequences which produce 
inequality between people with genetic and non-genetic health problems, and also 
between the classes.
D. Alternative Ways Out of the Dilemma
  Although we admit that it is practically impossible and morally unfair to treat 
genetic information differently from other medical information, we should not 
presuppose that we have only one option, namely, no legal protection should be 
provided for genetic information against genetic discrimination. Here, there is 
another normative question that we have to discuss before we reach this conclusion. 
Even though in practice it is impossible to treat genetic information differently from 
other medical information and, in theory it is unfair to do so, these observations do 
not necessarily mean that the law ought not to protect genetic privacy and prevent 
genetic discrimination. We should distinguish the issue between "is" and "ought o 
be." The latter is the normative issue. If we can not draw a line between genetic 
information and other medical information, and it is unfair for the law to protect 
only people with negative genetic profiles and leave people with negative non-
c genetic profiles unprotected, it might be possible to argue why it can not be the 
opposite way. In other words, if genetic privacy is of very important value to each 
of us and there is a strong need to prevent genetic discrimination, why do we not 
design the law so as to prohibit insurers and employers from having access and
128) Chetan Gulati, supra note 16, at 151.
234 OSAKA UNIVERSITYLAWREVIEW [No. 53: 199
using all types of predictive medical information in order to protect all people 
equally regardless of whether their information is genetic or non-genetic, against 
discrimination in the workplace and health insurance field? 
  Charles J. Sykes states that "[t]he answer is not to leave genetic information 
unprotected, but to create protection for all medical information, including genetic 
data." 129) Some of the commentators who point out the fundamental problems of 
the genetic-specific anti-discrimination laws also think in the saure way including 
the author of this paper. However, this conclusion creates additional issues. Those 
commentators who reject the genetic-specific anti-discrimination laws should 
present an alternative policy to protect genetically unlucky people from genetic 
discrimination and fend the way out of the dilemma. Without presenting such an 
alternative, the real problem can not be resolved. Accordingly, in this section, I
consider such alternative policies.
              a. DHHS Privacy Regulations of 2000 
  As has been seen before, Suter points out the problems of genetic 
exceptionalism and strongly rejects enacting genetic-specific anti-discrimination 
laws. However, she does not think that leaving genetic information unprotected is
acceptable. Rather, she argues that all predictive medical information, including 
genetic information, should be protected against genetic discrimination. Then, 
what is an alternative which can replace genetic-specific anti-discrimination law? 
On December 22, 2000, the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) 
issued the final rules designed to protect he privacy of personal health information. 
It was promulgated by the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) 
under the authority of the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 
1996 (HIPAA).130) Suter regards the privacy regulations as an ideal alternative 
approach. She asserts that "HIPAA privacy regulations, in short, avoid the trap of 
genetic exceptionalism" since the "federal privacy regulations protect all 
individually identifiable health information used or disclosed electronically or 
orally by health plans, health clearinghouses, and health care providers ... and the 
regulations protect the most sensitive medical information-identifiable medical
129) CHARLES J. SYKES, supra note 35, at 132. 
130) Standards. for Privacy for Individually Identifiable Health Infbrnnation, 65 Fed. Reg. at 82, 464, 
    620, 804. 801 (Dec. 28, 2000). Both the proposed rule and the final rule are available at <http:// 
    aspe.lihs.gov/admnsimp/index.html>; <.html" http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/hipaa/finalmaster.html>; 
    <http:// www.hhs.gov/news/press/2001pres/200I0706a.html> (July 6, 2001).
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information-and they include, but are not limited to, genetic information." 131) 
  According to the commentary made by Human Genome Project Information, 
    [t]he new standards: lirait the non-consensual use and releaseof private 
   health information; give patients new rights to access their medical 
    records and to know who else has accessed them; restrict most disclosure 
    of health information to the minimum needed for the intendedpurpose; 
    establish new criminal and civil sanctions for improper use or disclosure; 
    and establish new requirements for access to records by researchers and 
    others. They are not specific to genetics, rather they are sweeping 
    regulations governing ail personal health information. 132) 
  To be free from the trap of genetic exceptionalism, thiskind of regulation which 
designs to protect ail individually identifiable health information could be one 
plausible path out of the dilemma. However, this kind of strategy where genetic 
information is protected by incorporating it into the general privacy protection of all 
health information is promising only when it provides trong protection.
   b. Universal Single-Payer / Community-Rating Health Care System 
  Jon Beckwith and Joseph S. Alper address the dilemma in regulating genetic 
discrimination. On the one hand, "genetic antidiscrimination laws are needed 
because genetic discrimination is a real problem that seems certain to expand 
dramatically as many new tests become available."133) On the other hand, current 
genetic antidiscrimination laws which are "based on the misconception" of "the 
presumption that a clear distinction exists between genetic and nongenetic 
information, tests, and diseases" are flawed.134) 
  One way that Beckwith and Alper suggest to solve this dilemma is to introduce 
a "single-payer universal health tare system." In this system, they insist that 
"distinction between genetic and nongenetic diseases and tests become totally 
unnecessary. Because everyone would already be insured, problems such as adverse 
selection in health insurance would not exist."135) They assert that "genetic 
discrimination legislation is required because it attempts to address a deeper and
131) Sonia M. Suter, supra note 7, at 673. 
132) Human Genome Project Information, Genetic Privacy and Legislation, available at <http:// 
    www.oml.gov/TechResources/Human_Genome/elsi/legislat.html> (last visited July 10, 2002). 
133) Jon Beckwith & Joseph S. Alper, Reconsidering Genetic Antidiscriniination Legislation, 26 J.L. 
   MES. & ErHics 205, 208 (1998). 
134) Id. 
135) Id.
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more pervasive underlying problem than discrimination arising from the use of 
genetic information alone. The problem is not merely discrimination based on 
genetics, but also discrimination based on any type of predictive medical 
information." 136) They defined genetic information as information which includes 
not only genetic material itself but also family history and ethnicity.137) Therefore, 
they emphasize "the importance of prohibiting discrimination based on all types of 
predictive medical information as opposed to prohibiting only that discrimination 
based on a person's genotype."138) 
  Elaine Draper also states that "[a]nti-discrimination laws should be extended to 
cover genetic predispositions, to guard against individuals being labeled and 
penalized as high-risk."139) However, Draper notes that "[a]lthough the ADA 
arguably covers individuals perceived to be susceptible to illness and not just those 
who are symptomatic, that coverage is by no means certain." 1411) Under this 
circumstance, she mentions a national single-payer health-care system of 
government-financed services as a policy recommendation for a way out of the 
present problems. Draper notes that "[i]n addition to legal protections against 
genetic discrimination, universal access to health services is a crucial concern in 
addressing problems of genetic discrimination, privacy, and availability of health 
care."141) In order to assure availability of health care, Draper finds a desirable 
policy for "[n]ational health coverage and a single-payer health-care system of 
government-financed services" and states that "[it] could mean that high-risk 
individuals and groups would no longer be denied health coverage or affordable 
medical care. They would thus have less to fear from screening under such a 
system."142) She states that under this system, "[m]andated national health 
coverage would remedy problems within the workers' compensation system that 
now encourage people to seek compensation benefits simply to get medical 
coverage. It would also assist people who now decline health insurance coverage 
because of the high cost of premium co-payments that many companies 
require."143) Moreover, Draper notes that "[w]ith national health care, investigators
136) Id. at 209. 
137) Id. 
138) Id. (emphasis added). 
139) Elaine Draper, The Screening of Anierica: The Social and Legal Framework of Employers' Use 
    of Genetic Information, 20 BERKELEY J. EMPLOYMENT & LABOR L. 286, 315 (1999). 
140) Id. 
141) Id. at 318. 
142) Id. 
143) Id.
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could use national data systems to track suspected employee hazards and disease 
patterns by workplace or region, which would facilitate mortality and morbidity 
studies."144) Draper asserts that "[d]espite political obstacles to enacting a national 
single-payer system, political eaders could overcome opposition to reform by 
educating the public about he expense, the gaps in coverage, and the inequities of
the current health care delivery system."145) 
  According to Gulati, genetic antidiscrimination laws are misguided solutions as 
the title of his article "Genetic Antidiscrimination Laws In Health Insurance: A
Misguided Solution " shows. However, contrary to Suter, Gulati states that the 
consequences of the insufficient protections against genetic discrimination provided 
by genetic antidiscrimination laws will ironically create a "policy window" for 
more radical changes to the health care financing system such as a universal single-
payer health care system which Gulati believes to be the best solution to solve 
genetic discrimination. 146) 
  Another alternative may be found in the community-rating health insurance 
system. Under this system, contrary to individual risk-rating, underwriting is
processed by depending on the experience of all the community. 
  Jennifer S. Geetter fends an alternative in this approach. She asserts a 
community-rating health insurance system which abolishes risk-rating and 
introduces a community-rating system as an alternative policy.147) She states that 
"[c]ommunity-rating means acommitment to a social norm that as a society we will 
not allocate health benefits on the basis of health conditions that are largely beyond 
our control."148) And also community-rating "would represent an explicit 
commitment to low-risk individuals ubsidizing high-risk individuals- a sort of 
progressive insurance r gime."149) 
  In order to makecommunity-rating workable and feasible, a certain size of 
community pool or certain mandatory orcompulsory health care system isrequired. 
Therefore, it is debatable whether a community-rating health insurance system can 
be achieved in the private health insurance market with or without some 
governmental intervention. To examine the possibility of building a community-
rating health insurance system in the market is beyond the scope of this paper.
144) Id. 
145) Id. 
146) Chetan Gulati, supra note 16, at 151. 
147) Jennifer S. Geetter, supra note 49, ai 68. 
148) Id. at 69. 
149) Id.
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However, we can put it on the list of alternative strategies for a way out of the 
dilemma over genetic privacy and the discrimination issues. 
  If the community-rating is achieved as a national scale, it becomes a system like 
the universal single-payer health care system.
V. Conclusion
   In the former part of this paper, I examined several key issues in drafting such 
laws (Section II). First, I examined the scope of genetic information: I addressed 
the problem in narrow and broad definition (Section II-A). One of the most 
difficult issues in drafting a genetic-specific anti-discrimination law is the scope 
and definition of genetic information. If genetic information is narrowly defined as 
limited only to genetic test results or DNA analysis, a great deal of genetic 
information obtained through other sources such as clinical evaluations, non-
genetic tests, and family and medical history, are left unprotected and therefore 
genetic privacy is not sufficiently protected and genetic discrimination cannot be 
prevented. On the other hand, if genetic information is defined broadly enough to 
encompass all of these genetic-linked information such as genes, gene products, or 
inherited traits that may derive from an individual or family member, it is almost 
impossible to distinguish between genetic information and other medical 
information because it inevitably includes heart disease, cancer, diabetes, etc. which 
have been traditionally regarded as non-genetic diseases but in fact caused by the 
combination of genetic traits and environmental factors. 
  Another issue that I examined is the affirmative use of favorable genetic 
information or clean bill of genetic makeup (Section II-B). This is a question of 
whether or not we should also legally ban taking an individual's favorable genetic 
information disclosed voluntarily into account in the underwriting process. I 
asserted that if the law allows favorable use of genetic information, it eventually 
results in almost the saure adverse effects for the individuals who do not submit 
favorable genetic information because non-submissions imply that there is a high 
possibility that they have unfavorable genetic information. Therefore, I argued that 
if we aim to protect individuals against reating some individuals with gene defects 
adversely, using favorable genetic information of some genetically lucky 
individuals in order to get advantage should also be prohibited. The final issue that 
I addressed is authorized disclosure and différent types of regulatory strategy 
(Section II-C). In general, genetic-specific anti-discrimination state statutes 
prohibit only "unauthorized" disclosure and not "authorized" or "voluntary"
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disclosure of genetic information. However, I noted that especially in the 
employment settings, if the law makes an authorized isclosure legal, employers 
easily can find a big loophole because it is sometimes very hard to prove that 
discriminatory use was made in the process of selecting job applicants. Therefore, I 
argued that not only banning the use of genetic information (Harm Avoidance or 
End-loading approach) but also prohibiting access to and acquisition of genetic 
information by regulating authorized disclosure is indispensable (Front-loading 
approach). 
  Another agenda I explored in the latter part of this paper was why many federal 
attempts to enact a genetic nondiscrimination law have failed. I do not believe that 
these failures can be explained sufficiently only by the strong political pressures of 
the lobbying activities of the health insurance industry and large employer groups. 
I believe that good reasons why no federal evel comprehensive law designed to 
prohibit genetic discrimination bas been enacted so far and why state statutes vary 
so greatly, can be obtained by examining the problems genetic-specific anti-
discrimination laws approach. Under this academic interest, in Section III and IV, I 
examined the problems of genetic-specific anti-discrimination laws. 
   The next question is whether we can distinguish genetic information from other 
medical information. To answer this question, I identified the nature and features 
of genetic information. In so doing, I examined "genetic exceptionalism" (Section 
III-A). Genetic exceptionalism is a principle which asserts that genetic information 
is substantially différent from non-genetic information, and therefore, a line can be 
drawn somewhere in between genetic information and other medical information. 
The argument of genetic exceptionalism is based on the observations of the unique 
characters and specific features of genetic information. Such unique features are 
represented by the increased nature of vulnerability to genetic discrimination and 
stigmatization, the longevity of DNA (immutable nature), the highly identifiable 
feature of DNA, increased familial risks, and community impacts, and the like. 
Even though several specific features of genetic information could be identified, I
demonstrated that it is practically impossible to draw a line between genetic 
information and other medical information (Section III-A). Thus, I noted that the 
more genetic technology advances, the more practically impossible it will become 
to distinguish between the two and find where the line is to be drawn. Therefore, in 
order to protect genetic privacy appropriately, the law should also protect the 
privacy of all of the predictive medical information as well as the so-called genetic 
information. I have also pointed out how these definitional difficulties of genetic 
information resulted in both over-inclusiveness (Section III-B) and under-
240 OSAKA UNJVERSITY LAW REVIEW [No. 53: 199
inclusiveness (Section III-C) of the protection against genetic discrimination. Since 
virtually no genetic-specific legislation can be drafted without more or less 
presupposing that a line can be drawn between genetic and non-genetic 
information, the legislation is not free from the practical problems of genetic 
exceptionalism. I believe these practical problems could offer a good explanation 
on the inconsistency of the coverage of the statutes among the states. 
  However, more serious and fundamental problems inherent in the genetic-
specific anti-discrimination laws are normative problems stemming from genetic 
exceptionalism. This issue has been addressed in Section IV. By referring to the 
arguments presented by Sonia M. Suter, I pointed out that genetic-specific anti-
discrimination laws are unfair and create an inequality in that the laws give 
protection of privacy only to genetic information and not to other medical 
information, and we cannot find any gond moral reason for giving greater legal 
protection only to a person whose elevated risk, for instance, to develop breast 
cancer happens to be traceable to a gene mutation and not provide protection to 
another whose elevated risk is traceable to environmental exposure (Section IV-A). 
Moreover, this inequality leads to social inequality between the classes. Based on 
the arguments delivered by Suter, I have shown that genetic-specific legislation 
disproportionately treats the most vulnerable low socioeconomic lass adversely 
(Section IV-B). And then, I considered incrementalism as one plausible defense for 
genetic-specific legislations but concluded that the arguments of incrementalism are 
not appropriate in justifying the normative problems of the laws (Section IV-C). 
Here, I identified a serions dilemma over the genetic discrimination issues: there is 
a strong need to protect genetic privacy and prevent genetic discrimination, but at 
the saure time genetic-specific anti-discrimination laws have unavoidable practical 
problems which produce over- and under-inclusiveness and also serious inherent 
normative problems which result in unintended unfair consequences between 
people with genetic health problems and those with non-genetic health problems, 
and also between the socioeconomic lasses. I believe that these normative 
problems - unfair protection and inequalities could offer one plausible explanation 
on the fact that it is hard to enact a comprehensive genetic-specific anti-
discrimination bill in the U.S. Congress. 
  By observing the practical and normative flaws of genetic-specific anti-
discrimination laws, I have reached the insight that if we aim to prevent genetic 
discrimination by law, it is inevitable that we also have to design the law to prohibit 
all discriminations on the basic of all predictive medical information in the health 
insurance and employment arena. Therefore, 1 considered a national single-payer /
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mandatory community-rating health insurance system, and DHHS Privacy 
Regulations of 2000 as such alternative ways to protect all predictive medical 
information against discriminatory use in the insurance arena (Section IV-D). 
  The fundamental issue that I explored in this paper was regardingwhether or not 
these fundamental problems inherent in the genetic-specific laws justify the 
argument asserting that the law should not prohibit insurers and employers from 
taking genetic information into account in their discriminatory decisions. Some 
commentators may emphasize these problems of the anti-discrimination laws to 
justify the discriminatory use of genetic information. However, we can reach the 
opposite conclusion as seen in the argument presented by Suter. That is, if we 
intend to prohibit genetic discrimination adequately, the law should be and, in fact, 
inevitably must be designed to protect all predictive medical information against 
discrimination. Why not protect all predictive medical information against all kinds 
of discrimination instead of limiting it to genetic discrimination? In other words, 
the real issue that we face right here is not how to prevent genetic discrimination 
but the very issue that we have to debate seriously is whether or not the law should 
ban discrimination on the basis of all predictive medical information. However, 
this is an open question that has not yet reached a consensus because American 
tradition has been legally admitted to take medical information (health status or 
condition) into account in the underwriting practice in insurance as "actuarial 
fairness." In other words, protecting all predictive medical information from 
discriminatory use means a paradigm shift in the long-standing practice in the 
private health insurance system in the U.S. In order to answer this question, both 
the reasons of the proponents and the opponents of the anti-discrimination laws and 
balance of interests between the merits of banning discrimination and the adverse 
consequences resulting from such prohibition must be fully addressed and 
examined. 
   Even though the federal genetic nondiscrimination bill should be enacted, the 
real issue has not yet been solved and the ultimate question is whether it is 
justifiable to protect the privacy of all predictive medical information in the 
insurance and employment context. In order to answer this question, it seems 
requisite to examine what kind of unintended adverse consequences and side-
effects wauld be produced if the law should prohibit the use of all predictive 
medical information and what the theoretical grounds are to justify such a policy in 
spite of its producing serious side-effects. This is the issue I will address in another 
paper to be published at another opportunity.
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